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Abstract. This essay explores the economic dynamics of global competition versus regional 
interests corresponding to the treatment of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in India and the relative 
effects of such policies on its domestic pharmaceutical industry.  The scope of considerations are 
formally limited to variables implicative of the transnational flow of capital within the 
pharmaceuticals industry, most specifically those pertaining to foreign direct investment (FDI).    
India, as the second most populated country in the world, has been the focus of much discussion 
regarding patent violations in its pharmaceutical industry. International pressures and membership 
covenants of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have succeeded in structuring policy such that 
process patents are now legitimized.  This has brought dilemmas between global and regional 
conflicts of interest to open discussion, and has become a pressing political agenda among various 
industry stakeholders.  This paper discusses the history of Indian internal protection in the 
pharmaceutical industry and suggests ways in which India may continue to benefit when regulatory 
barriers are reduced and global trade covenants are abided.  The essay  first examines trends in 
global FDI and Knowledge Process Outsourcing (KPO).  It highlights changes to Indian policy, and 
subsequently discusses other matters associated with the protection of IPRs including parallel 
imports, price discrimination, and corruption.  Lastly, suggestions are made for viable ways of 
enabling India to comply with WTO mandates for participation in the global marketplace, while 
concurrently attending to its domestic needs as well.   
 
1 Introduction 
 
This essay explores the economic dynamics of global competition versus regional interests corresponding to the 
treatment of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in India and the relative effects of such policies on its domestic 
pharmaceutical industry.  The scopes of considerations are formally limited to variables implicative of the 
transnational flow of capital within the pharmaceuticals industry, most specifically those pertaining to foreign 
direct investment (FDI).     
India, as the second most populated country in the world, has been the focus of much discussion regarding 
patent violations in its pharmaceutical industry.  Throughout much of the industry’s history, neither 
pharmaceutical processes nor end products (such as a pill) patents have been considered legally valid within the 
internal legal structure of India.  International pressures and membership covenants of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) have succeeded in structuring policy such that process patents are now legitimized.  In recent 
years, end product patents have also found legitimacy in Indian rule of law.  This has brought dilemmas between 
global and regional conflicts of interest to open discussion, and has become a pressing political agenda among 
various industry stakeholders.   
This paper discusses the history of Indian internal protection in the pharmaceutical industry and suggests 
ways in which India may continue to benefit when regulatory barriers are reduced and global trade covenants are 
abided.  The structure of this essay is arranged as follows: it first examines trends in global FDI and Knowledge 
Process Outsourcing (KPO).  It highlights changes to Indian policy, and subsequently discusses other matters 
associated with the protection of IPRs including parallel imports, price discrimination, and corruption.  Lastly, 
suggestions are made for viable ways of enabling India to comply with WTO mandates for participation in the 
global marketplace, while concurrently attending to its domestic needs as well.   
                                                        
* Of Loyola University Chicago, we thank Pooja Shah for her pertinent comments on an earlier draft of this paper and we are 
grateful to Dr. Pallav Gupta, MD, MBA, for important comments reflecting viewpoints of Indian healthcare providers. 
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2. World Pharmaceutical Investments, TRIPS, and FDI 
 
The role of pharmaceutical trade in the global economy has increased substantially in recent years.  Facilitated in 
part by advancing technology and the infinite need for cures and treatment options, world pharmaceutical 
industries are growing rapidly while becoming more globalized.  According to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) (2009), the world trade volume for pharmaceutical commodities increased from approximately USD 
247.991 billion in 2004, to USD 426.672 billion during 2008 [See Figure 1A].1 
 
Figure 1A 
Merchandise Trade by Commodity 
Units in US Dollars at Current Prices (Millions) 
 
Reporter Flow Indicator Partner  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
World Exports Pharmaceuticals World 247991 274419 312731 372457 426672 
World Imports Pharmaceuticals World 251001 277146 313091 372457 426672 
China Exports Pharmaceuticals World 3234 3778 4486 6000 8070 
China Imports Pharmaceuticals World 1899 2309 2715 3889 5508 
India Exports Pharmaceuticals World 2218 2713 3436 4523 5766 
India Imports Pharmaceuticals World 689 970 1180 1606 1866 
United States Exports Pharmaceuticals World 23980 25946 29265 33610 38339 
United States Imports Pharmaceuticals World 35371 39323 46222 53954 59868 
 
Source: World Trade Organization: http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx  
(Table manually created using statistics database.) 
 
 Consequential of such significant growth rates, many markets in which pharmaceutical products are 
developed and traded are affected by the evolving industry.  Factors such as infrastructure, labour force 
characteristics, the need for capital, the number of firms in a given market, competition levels, and the prices of 
consumer products are only a small number of the considerations implicated by the growing industry.  Naturally, 
such factors impact the behaviour of firms in the industry as companies seek new ways to adapt to a changing 
environment and remain competitive.  As a result, many countries with markets affected by the trading of 
pharmaceuticals have a necessary concern for how factors of industry growth impact their domestic economies.    
On one hand, many nations are quite receptive to the introduction of multinational pharmaceutical firms as 
a means of facilitating the flow of capital and luring foreign direct investment (FDI) into domestic markets.  
Seeking benefits often inherent of FDI such as increased efficiency in resource allocation, knowledge and 
technology transfers, or infrastructural improvements, developing nations have a strong desire, in this context, to 
maintain capital inflows for the cultivation of domestic industry.2 On the other hand, motivated efforts to draw in 
FDI are often found to be associated with high drug prices in relative markets and result in an inadequate provision 
of medicines to poorer demographics.  This means there is often an evident trade-off between the ability of nations 
to attract FDI and moderate the price of drugs to levels conducive for widespread distribution.  Furthermore, there 
are additional concerns for the impact of FDI on indigenous industries relative to the displacement of domestically 
held equity as foreign firms enter the marketplace. 
 In view of such concerns regarding FDI, many nations’ policies are reflective of attempts to attract capital 
to the degree that it is advantageous to domestic industries, yet restrain the inflow of FDI from reaching the extent 
that it becomes detrimental to domestic industry growth and healthcare as a result of higher competition and drug 
prices. For instance, if FDI is injected into a given industry to the extent that foreign firms hold the majority of 
equity in that industry, then the relative growth of domestic companies may be hindered by the inability to 
compete in said market.3  As a result, many countries’ policies seem to exhibit an inward focus, reflective of the 
attempt to safeguard national interests through the moderation of foreign capital in local trade and production, 
                                                        
1 World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics, Annual Trade Statistics, Statistics Database, World Trade 
Organization (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2009). 
2 Susan E. Feinberg and Sumit K. Majumdar, "Technology Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment in the Indian 
Pharmaceutical Industry," Journal of International Business Studies (Palgrave Macmillan Journals) 32, no. 3 (3rd Qtr. 2001): 
421-437. 
3 This argument assumes that all different sizes of domestic firms will suffer the same fate with FDI.  However, our 
observations show that large and efficient local firms go into joint ventures with foreign partners and actually benefit from FDI.  
Less efficient, small sized, and small scale economy firms do suffer. 
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which has often been apparent in Indian policy.4 This argument assumes that different sizes of domestic firms will 
suffer the same fate in regards to FDI.  However, observations show that larger and more efficient domestic firms 
often enter into joint ventures with foreign partners, causing those firms to actually benefit from FDI.  Rather, it is 
many times the less efficient, smaller firms that suffer. 
 Relative to industry firms, the policies instituted by a particular nation bear heavy influence on the 
lucrativeness of producing and marketing products in that country.  Further, due to the variability of laws between 
many nations, dissimilar policy regimes may affect the trading of pharmaceuticals on a global scale; an impact 
also felt by firms in the industry.   Thus, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has a keen interest in the relative 
policy structures of member nations, and focuses efforts to support the trading of pharmaceuticals by reducing 
barriers to trade and standardizing regulatory practices that may otherwise serve as hindrances.5 
For pharmaceutical companies, one of the largest concerns facing a firm in any country is that nation’s 
treatment of intellectual property rights (IPRs).  Accordingly, the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) signifies an attempt to address those concerns by attempting to reduce the 
variability of IPR protection between two or more countries’ policy regimes.  Conceived as part of the Uruguay 
Round, the goal of the TRIPS Agreement is to:  
“Reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking into account the need to promote 
effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to 
enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.”6  
  Correspondingly, the protection of intellectual property is a key component in attracting FDI because it 
creates the incentive for such property to be developed in a particular country.  For pharmaceuticals, such 
protection is often granted in the form of patents, whereby the patent holder retains the sole rights to produce, 
market, and thus profit from her invention.7  Contrarily, a lack of patent protection provides a disincentive for 
pharmaceutical innovations to be developed in a certain country due to the inherent risk of that property being 
generically reproduced and marketed by other parties, thereby inhibiting the creator from profiting, or possibly 
even recouping the costs of developing the product.8 In other words, as suggested by Jamie Feldman (2009), 
“intellectual property rights are the fundamental driving forces behind the pharmaceutical industry.”9  
Furthermore, an additional implication of patent protection for pharmaceutical IPRs is the monopolistic 
power often afforded to patent holders in corresponding markets. The exclusive right of a given entity to develop, 
produce, and market a particular product amidst the absence of competitors, affords that firm the potential to 
profit.  Further, because profits are a necessary condition under which pharmaceutical companies are willing to 
develop products in a given nation, it is therefore the expected size of such profits that determines the degree of a 
firm’s incentive to invest, and which ultimately dictates the level of FDI said country receives in that industry.     
In addition, given the exclusive right to produce and market certain products, firms are inherently endowed 
with the ability to subjectively price such products.10 While this often enables firms to act monopolistically, it also 
leads to pharmaceuticals being expensive and thus unattainable by poor populations like many of those in India, 
where patent protection means that much of the population is unable to enjoy the benefits of medical technology. 
11  Although, without the rule of law providing protection to patent holders, developing nations would risk 
foregoing substantial amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) in pharmaceutical markets, and thus the 
development of some medical technologies may be inhibited in the first place.12   
However, sales are dependent upon the ability and willingness of consumers to pay, whereby the difference 
in the resulting revenue and cost to produce such a quantity represents a firm’s profit margin.  In recent years, 
many pharmaceutical companies have begun to pay attention to the opportunity cost of high-priced patented drugs, 
which fail to reach many consumer sectors of markets due to lack of affordability.  Further, with consideration for 
the variability of IPR protection, as well as the inevitable expiration of patents on drugs and looming generic 
companies seeking to scoop up relative market shares, many firms in the pharmaceuticals industry have begun to 
                                                        
4 Susan E. Feinberg and Sumit K. Majumdar (2001): 421-437. 
5 Anna Lanoszka, "The Global Politics of Intellectual Property Rights and Pharmaceutical Drug Policies in Developing 
Countries," International Political Science Review (Sage Publications) 24, no. 2 (April 2003): 181-197. 
6 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS): Appendix 1A. 
7 Patents Act 1970: chap. 8(48). 
8 Shubham Chaudhuri, Pinelopi K Goldberg and Panle Jia, "Estimating the Effects of Global Patent Protection in 
Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of Quinolones in India," The American Economic Review (American Economic Association) 
96, no. 5 (December 2006): 1477. 
9 Jamie Feldman, "Compulsory Licenses: The Dangers behind the Current Practice," Journal of International Business & Law 
(Hofstra University School of Law) 8, no. 1 (2009): 139. 
10 Whether the prices are based on average cost plus markup or price discrimination depend on price elasticities of demand, or 
marginal cross pricing, relative to competitive conditions. 
11 Anna Lanoszka (2003): 182. 
12 Susan E. Feinberg and Sumit K. Majumdar (2001): 426. 
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look at generic drugs markets as containing the future of industry profits.13 According to the Economist (2008), 
many of the world’s top pharmaceutical companies that generate the majority of profits in the United States are 
now looking to generic and emerging markets in preparation for potential policy revisions. Part of the worry is that 
recent political transformations and relative healthcare reforms may soon expose U.S. markets to generic 
pharmaceutical imports from Canada, or allow for discounts to be negotiated with companies that could alleviate 
much of the profits associated with high drug prices. 
Dynamics of patented drug pricing, whether in the developed home market such as the US or Switzerland, 
depends on costs, competitive conditions, and the bargaining power of the government and insurance companies 
with the firm.  In developed countries, where 60-90 percent of workers and household members may be insured 
through public or private means, individuals’ ability to pay becomes an issue for only a small percentage of the 
uninsured.  In developing countries where public employee percentages are low and private medical insurance is 
nonexistent or haphazard, the ability to pay issue involves the majority of the respective populations.  
The optimism however, for developing nations’ drug markets, is high.  Exemplifying this perspective is the 
world’s largest pharmaceutical company, Pfizer, which announced its intent to reorient the company structure with 
a focus that prioritizes developing countries.14  As Pfizer quoted in The Economist (2008), its participation in such 
markets is motivated now as “a business, not a charity,” whereas in years past, deviating from the market of high-
priced drug sales may have been considered a less profitable venture.  Consistent with this attitude, Pfizer has 
established an agreement with Aurobindo Pharma, an Indian generic drug manufacturer, with expectations that 
generic drug sales will generate $1 billion in annual revenue by 2012.  
In general, the opportunities apparent in developing countries are substantial, and serve as attractive lures 
for FDI.  In fact, it is predicted by industry consultants that emerging markets will account for sales equal to those 
in the United States and top five EU markets combined by 2017.15  Further, Pfizer believes that the current drug 
market for individuals with annual incomes below $3,000 is potentially worth $30 billion annually, which by 
2012, may be as worth as much as $60-70 billon.16  Such a forecast for growth in developing countries thus 
suggests that the incentive for companies to seek operational holdings in those nations is substantial, and will 
continue to increase in the future.   
Furthermore, the changing market environment for globalized pharmaceutical investments also suggests 
that the incentive for developing countries to attract FDI may increase to provide for the transfer of technology and 
access to medicines for those nations’ populations.17  For India, FDI used for generic drugs has the potential to 
dissolve many concerns for the availability of medicines to the nation’s poor—FDI that has previously represented 
a tradeoff between IPR protection and access to affordable drugs, and thus a disincentive for stringent patent 
security laws.18 
Accordingly, the progression of the pharmaceutical industry into generic markets may present the 
possibility of patent protection and affordable drugs coexisting, creating interesting challenges for the treatment of 
IPR policies. Some of the most critical considerations for India in regards to the future of its pharmaceutical 
industry and the innovation of medical technology pertain to the stringency of its patent laws.  Hopefully by 
acknowledging the evolution of the industry and understanding how firms respond economically to changes in 
policy, India may be able to appropriate its rule of law to find a more harmonious balance between facilitating FDI 
and addressing its domestic concerns for industry and public health.   
3.  Knowledge Process Outsourcing (KPO) and India 
  
Consistent with the prevalence of globalized industries, knowledge-based firms are drawn to advantages afforded 
by the labour markets of many emerging economies.  Often finding an abundance of highly trained and educated 
workers, many companies are able to experience the benefits of substantially lower labour costs, without 
sacrificing productivity.  Such outsourcing efforts have thus come to be known as knowledge process outsourcing 
(KPO)19; a context in which emerging markets have become particularly appealing to specialized industries. 
                                                        
13 The Economist, Racing Down the Pyramid: Big Drugmakers' Love Affair with America is Coming to an End, November 13, 
2008, http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TNGDTRVN (accessed November 2, 2009). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Susan E. Feinberg and Sumit K. Majumdar (2001): 421-437. 
18 Id. 
19 Sonia Baldia, "Knowledge Process Outsourcing to India: Important Considerations for U.S. Companies," in Doing Business 
in India: Critical Legal Issues for U.S. Companies, 171-209 (New York, New York: Practising Law Institute, 2007). 
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In particular, India provides one of the most conducive environments for firms looking to establish KPO 
operations.  Infrastructural developments and policy revisions have spurred substantial economic growth in India 
over the last couple decades, and its uniquely desirable labor force enhances the viability of profits for foreign, 
knowledge-based firms. U.S. pharmaceutical companies such as Eli Lilly, GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, Novartis and 
AstraZeneca all hold sectors of their clinical testing departments in India as part of KPO operations.20  According 
to Sonia Baldia (2006), such companies seek to establish operations in India in an effort to “tap into India’s vast 
and diverse population and pool of highly-skilled, but lower-wage demanding scientists,” maintaining that such 
efforts “can significantly accelerate the trial time and time to market for new drugs on top of potential cost savings 
of up to 40-60 percent”. 21 
Such a combination of lower costs and higher productivity make India an attractive environment for 
many knowledge-based industries, including pharmaceuticals where the trade-off between qualified workers and 
wages can heavily affect marginal product and revenue. Compared to the United States, where the estimated cost 
is near one billion USD to develop and market a new pharmaceutical product, the cost of bringing a new drug to 
market in India is about half.22  Further, a simultaneous increase in productivity and decrease in costs often means 
higher profits—measured relative to both the savings in labour costs, as well as the difference in time to market 
similar products in other countries. 
In addition to an alluring labour market, foreign capital inflow is further propelled through KPO by 
India’s strong economic environment.  As of 2007, India had the world’s second largest population and the second 
greatest purchasing power GDP among developing nations.23  At the same time (2007), Indian markets were said 
to be growing at an annual rate of eight-percent.24 In 2009, India’s primary stock index, Sensex, has grown by 
close to one hundred percent since March, reflecting the $13.8 billion in foreign investment that has been injected 
into the markets from April to November.25 
Accordingly, the advantages presented by India’s economic environment are naturally conducive to 
research and development operations, providing opportunities for firms to profit from relative labour costs and 
continuous economic growth.  Further, the prospects for KPO ventures in India are likely to increase, as India 
progressively becomes a more prevalent participant in world markets.  In fact, while it currently holds roughly 
three percent of the global market for outsourcing, a study by the Organization of Pharmaceutical Producers in 
India (OPPI) and Ernst & Young (E&J) (2009) reports that the Indian outsourcing industry exhibits a high 
potential for growth and that the outsourcing of pharmaceutical services is expected to rise.26 
However, regardless of its inherent economic advantages, India’s policy regime remains a necessary 
concern for firms considering KPO, and the need for IPR protection in many KPO operations raises the degree to 
which FDI is impacted by patent policies. 27 Necessarily, firms that develop intellectual property and consider the 
stringency of IPR protection to be a variable in determining specific risk will consider how expected profits are 
impacted by the appropriation of relative policies.  For instance, pharmaceutical companies that are dependent 
upon patent protection to secure the marketability of certain products are more exposed to risk if policies are less 
apt to maintain the exclusivity of those products in the marketplace.  A lesser degree of patent protection enhances 
the ability of competing firms to produce and sell substitutable products, causing the original firm to lose shares of 
market revenue, which lessens its margin for profit.  Such companies would associate the potential for IPR 
infringement with a certain level of risk, and treat any subsequent profit losses as a cost of doing business; hence, a 
disincentive for investing in India. Thus, India’s treatment of IPR security may heavily impact the rate at which its 
outsourcing industry is expected to grow. 
Correspondingly, the encompassing effect of patent policies in the context of KPO is that while India’s 
economic climate has been known to foster a somewhat ideal environment for growing companies, its historical 
                                                        
20 Id. 
21  We stipulate in this paper that the ability to hold large sample trials in an ethical and industry standard mode is one of the 
primary attractions luring clinical studies to a country such as India due to both time and cost gains. Here however, we 
emphasize the word ‘ethical’; there have been many known cases of unethical international trials where patients’ rights were 
not upheld, thus exposing them to risks associated with the trials.  Pharmaceutical companies are subject to the same moral 
rules that outsourced U.S. manufacturing and retailing companies subjected to.  Just as in the case of manufacturing 
subcontractors unethically exploiting child labor (when alternative schooling for these children is available), the same ethical 
binding restrictions should be placed on clinical trials subcontracted to local medical communities to ensure that patients’ rights 
and risks are clearly asserted. 
22 Sonia Baldia (2007): 171-209. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 The Economist (October 29, 2009). 
26 fe Bureaus, "The Financial Express," The Financial Express, August 14, 2009, 
http://www.financialexpress.com/news/emerging-mkts-to-boost-global-pharma-sector/501838/# (accessed December 2, 2009). 
27 Sonia Baldia (2007): 171-209. 
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structuring of patent laws has served to somewhat offset the benefits of that environment by implicating risk for 
firms whose profits are considerably dependent on IPR protection.  Although revisions of patent laws since the 
1990s and the introduction of the TRIPS agreement have dissolved much of this risk for companies and reduced 
the barriers for KPO operations in India,28 the correlation between the protection of IPRs and incentive for FDI 
inevitably still exists..   
4. Changes to Indian Patent Law and Impact 
  
Patent law in India dates as far back as 1856, in which patent protection was provided to inventors of new 
manufacturing technology for up to 14 years.29  Modelled after British policies, subsequent amendments to the act 
extended the privileges of patent protection to provide exclusivity to inventors in the making, marketing, and 
distribution of their innovations.30  
 It was not until 1911 that The Indian Patents and Designs Act allowed for patent policy to be controlled 
by the Controller of Patents in India, and not until India’s independence that economic and political conditions 
motivated the reform of its patent laws for domestic protection.31 According to the Controller General of Patents 
Designs and Trademarks (CGPDT) (2008), A committee was assigned by the Government of India in 1949 to 
contemplate an appropriation for patent laws that would be “conducive to the national interest,” instituting what 
many considered a ‘protectionist’ stance towards policy structure. 32  However, the objective of this approach was 
to promote the development of domestic industries through the natural ‘spillover’ of technologies brought in by 
foreign firms,33 and to safeguard the availability of affordable drugs for Indian consumers.34 India 
institutionalized a lack of barriers for pharmaceutical patent infringement with consideration for the larger public 
interest (sometimes interpreted as cheap prices in accordance with the ability to pay) and for national emergency 
situations. 
 Consistent with such policy objectives, the committee later brought about the 1950 amendment, which 
provided for the implementation of compulsory licenses.  Defined as a “license of right,” compulsory licenses 
enable the government to discretionarily set aside the rights to a patent with regard to public necessity or national 
emergency without the permission of the patent holder.35 In addition, a provision in 1953 called for medical 
innovations to be made publicly available, permitting compulsory licenses to be issued against patents involving 
food, medicines, germicides, fungicides or insecticides.36  Although the bills containing these riders were 
repeatedly introduced and let to lapse, all of the aforementioned were brought into law by The Patents Act 1970.37 
Effectively implemented in 1972, the Patents Act exclusively denied patent protection for pharmaceutical 
products, but rather made available the patenting of processes or methods of manufacturing for such products for 
seven years from the date of filing, or five years from the date the patent was granted.38  However, this did not 
include processes for treatment.39 According to the Patents Act of 1970, patentable property excluded “any process 
for the medicinal, surgical, curative, prophylactic or other treatment of human beings or any process for a similar 
treatment of animals or plants to render them free of disease or to increase their economic value or that of their 
products,” but permitted the patenting of manufacturing processes for “substances intended for use, or capable of 
being used, as food or as medicine or drug” [See Appendix 1B]. 40  The development of end-product drugs using 
                                                        
28 Id. 
29 Controller General of Patents Designs and Trademarks, "History of Indian Patent System," Government of India, July 15, 
2008, http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patents.htm (accessed October 9, 2009). 
30 Id. 
31 Controller General of Patents Designs and Trademarks (2008). 
32 Violeta I.: Prasad, Ashish S. Balan, "Strategies for U.S. Companies to Mitigate Legal Risks from Doing Business in India," 
in Doing Business in India: Critical Legal Issues for U.S. Companies, 9-60 (New York, New York: Practising Law Institute, 
2007), 24. 
See Also Susan E. Feinberg and Sumit K. Majumdar (2001): 421-437. 
33 Susan E. Feinberg and Sumit K. Majumdar (2001): 421-437. 
34 Shubham Chaudhuri (December 2006): 1477-1514. 
35 Feldman, Jamie (2009): 137-167. 
See also Controller General of Patents Designs and Trademarks (2008). 
36 Controller General of Patents Designs and Trademarks (2008). 
37 Id. 
38 Shubham Chaudhuri (December 2006): 1477-1514. 
See also Jacob Arfwedson, Re-importation (Parallel Trade) in Pharmaceuticals, Policy Report, IPI Center for Tehcnology 
Freedom, Institution for Policy Innovation (Lewisville: Institute for Policy Innovation, 2004). 
39 The Patents Act 1970, Chapter 2. 
40 Id. 
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different processes than the patented ones came to be loosely termed as “reverse engineering”, whereby a 
pharmaceutical firm devises a new process to manufacture an existing patented drug. 
 Subsequently, the culmination of policy changes implicated by the 1970 Patent Act had a substantial 
impact on FDI in India’s pharmaceutical industry, due largely to the sizeable ratio of foreign-to-domestic firms 
comprising the industry.  According to Prasad (2007), foreign pharmaceutical firms held 75-90 percent of India’s 
domestic market prior to the 1970 act, and patent applications were over three times as frequent by foreign 
nationals as Indian nationals. Further, considering that the average time for developing and testing a new drug can 
take as long as fifteen years,41 the 5-7 years of protection provided by the act effectively offered little or no 
marketing advantages to companies creating new medical technologies.  Thus, a patent could expire and allow for 
the process to be reproduced by other firms before the drug could even be completely developed; essentially 
granting 5-7 years of ‘free-rider’ status to firms reproducing generic substitutes, while straddling the innovating 
firm with sunk costs and a low return on invested capital as it enters the competitive market.  
Accordingly, while the proportions of foreign-to-domestic firms certainly helped propagate the initial 
passing of the act in line with national interests,42 its implications virtually eliminated incentives for foreign firms 
to develop pharmaceutical products in India.  The subsequent inflow of medical technology and FDI slowed 
drastically, hindering the progression of India’s pharmaceutical industry overall.  In fact, by the late 1980s, the 
average annual flow of FDI into India was merely about $100 million in total, compared to relative inflows into 
China, which were roughly $3.5 billion despite its economy having been liberalized only about a decade earlier, in 
1978. 43  Therefore, while the decrease in IPR protection enabled India to protect itself from foreign monopolies, it 
also caused India’s pharmaceutical industry to be less competitive in world markets, and virtually absent of 
innovation.   
Furthermore, while India was supporting protectionist policies of internal markets in the pharmaceutical 
industry, the pharmaceutical firms and industries of developed nations did not act in a timely manner to address 
the issues of affordability in emerging countries.44 Many protectionist policies were implemented with the 
consumer in mind, on whom the entire cost of medical care often falls in developing nations.  Accordingly, 
political protectionism is not often viewed as a weapon against the implementation of TRIPS, nor is it seen as an 
attempt to bypass patent laws, but looked at by many Indians in the context of diminishing costs to the consumer.  
The protectionist argument is that when a patent drug is marketed in a developed country, most of the time the cost 
is not directly borne by the consumer but by his/her insurance company.  In India however, the absence of 
healthcare insurance is highly prevalent amongst the general population, often causing the entire expense of 
medical treatment to fall on the consumer. 
Subsequently however, India observed the need to step away from its ‘protectionist’ policy structure, and 
enacted several reforms in 1991 aimed at liberalizing its economy to create a market environment more conducive 
to FDI.45  Although, the most significant change to its patent policies, and arguably the most impactful to its 
pharmaceutical industry, was India’s membership in the WTO and corresponding adoption of the Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).  Implemented as part of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round Agreement in 1994, TRIPS was fashioned as part of the WTO to 
standardize IPR policies and facilitate trade amongst member nations.46   
4.1 . TRIPS and FDI in India 
 
In contrast to the inward focus of past Indian policies, the TRIPS agreement provides mandates for India’s patent 
laws with the objective to create a more nurturing environment for industry growth and innovation.  Unlike the 
1970 Patents Act, one of the stipulations of TRIPS is that it provides patent protection not only to processes, but to 
the resulting products as well; requiring also that the duration of protection be no less than twenty years from the 
date the patent is initially filed (as opposed to the previous seven-year allotment).47 As a result, not only are new 
                                                        
41 Cheri Grace, The Effect of Changing Intellectual Property on Pharmaceutical Industry Prospects in India and China: 
Considerations for Access to Medicines, Government, Department for International Development, DFID Health Systems 
Resource Centre (London: Fretwells Ltd, 2004). 
42 Violeta I.: Prasad, Ashish S. Balan (2007): 24. 
43 Susan E. Feinberg and Sumit K. Majumdar (2001): 421-437. 
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innovations more able to be developed without the risk of infringement, but the protection of the resulting products 
may offer profitable rewards to the innovator. 
Particular to pharmaceutical industries, expanding the breadth and length of IPR protection under the 
TRIPS agreement has enabled India to exploit many of its intrinsic economic advantages, as the lack of patent 
protection is no longer presented as a formal hindrance to FDI.  Further, because India is one of 132 WTO 
countries for which the TRIPS agreement is intended, its standardized provisions naturally make India’s IPR 
policies more transparent to foreign firms.48  Considering that risk is associated with the predictability of a given 
outcome, the degree of conformity that TRIPS requires of Indian patent laws serves to alleviate much of the risk 
that pharmaceutical firms had prior to its implementation.  By mandatory levels of patent protection being upheld 
per the TRIPS agreement, a firm’s reliance on IPR policy as part of an investment ensures that it is not relying 
solely on the policies of the country in which it invests (i.e. India), but on the common policies of the 132 
countries that comprise the WTO.  Thus, IPR protection provided by the TRIPS agreement and the security that its 
provisions render to pharmaceutical companies enhances the facilitation of FDI in Indian markets as a result of its 
compliance.   
 Though the TRIPS agreement has strengthened India’s ability to procure FDI, there are some risks to 
patent protection that still remain.  While the TRIPS agreement does uphold the protection of patents and other 
IPRs, it also allows for the exception of patents for particular items, which are ultimately designated at the 
discretion of the issuing country.  Per article 27 of the TRIPS agreement, 
 
“Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of the 
commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ‘order public’ or morality, including to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, 
provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their 
law.” 
 
In the case of India, exceptions to patents are often issued in the form of compulsory licenses, which 
represent the rights that many nations reserve to act in the interest of the public for protection against the abuse of 
a patent by its holder.49  Though a compulsory license may be necessary in situations such as an epidemic (i.e. 
AIDS in Africa), where unlimited patent protection could threaten entire populations, the risk such a license 
otherwise poses to patent holders is dependent upon the definition of circumstance that compels its use.50 
For example, the necessity for compulsory licenses was highlighted during the AIDS epidemic in Africa 
when some companies refused to provide drugs at subsidized rates. At that time the cost of a single course of 
treatment for AIDS in Africa was greater than most individuals’ annual earnings. Even though there were 
companies in India that were willing to produce and supply the drugs at one-tenth the cost, the patent holders often 
refused to allow for parallel exports.  From a company’s perspective, in an industry such as pharmaceuticals where 
firms’ cost structures generally consist of high fixed and low marginal costs, the risks imposed by compulsory 
licenses often have a greater impact on profit margins and thus, may reduce the incentive to produce in a such a 
political environment. 
 Relative to TRIPS, the agreement’s failure to definitively stipulate conditions under which compulsory 
licenses may be used effectively provides an avenue through which countries may undermine the rights afforded 
by patent protection.51  For example, if a foreign firm develops a new drug for which the demand is sure to be 
high, a country could potentially contend that it is necessary to protect the public (aka, domestic firms) from the 
inability to compete with the prices of the patentee.  Although, such a practice would likely be avoided because it 
would raise concerns about preferential treatment, it is nonetheless possible, implicating considerable risk for 
patent holders.  Therefore, while the dependability of laws governing IPR protection may be accredited by the 
WTO, the risk associated with compulsory licensing is reflected in the credibility of the relative country; in this 
case, India.   
Accordingly, acknowledging the ‘protectionist’ demeanor of India’s previous policies, if credibility is a 
relevant variable implicative to the risks posed by compulsory licensing, then the lack of transparency that TRIPS 
provides for patent exceptions may be a major cause for the impediment of FDI in India.52  Companies are less 
capable of predicting the future returns on investments in the presence of ambiguous policies like compulsory 
licensing which, in turn, makes said investments more risky.  Consequently, the vagueness of compulsory 
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licensing policies (or “exclusions from patentability inventions” in TRIPS)53 enables the purpose of TRIPS to be 
undermined by member nations in direct contradiction to the stated objectives of the agreement.54 
Holistically, the changes to Indian patent law have had various levels of impact on the state of India’s 
domestic industries.  Observable however, is the correlation between the degree of protection afforded by patent 
policies and the level of foreign capital that India is able to accumulate (which is further exemplified by its 
adoption of TRIPS).   Further, though receiving WTO membership in 1994, because India was considered to be 
one of the lesser developed of the 132 member nations, it was not required by the WTO to fully comply with the 
conditions of the TRIPS agreement until January 1, 2005.55  Thus, because the most recent of vital changes to 
Indian patent policy have taken place in the last five years,56 it is likely that the true effects of changes to Indian 
patent policy are yet to be seen. 
5. Parallel Imports of Pharmaceuticals 
 
Parallel imports (also known as grey-market imports or goods that are ‘re-imported’)57 may be described as 
“goods produced genuinely under protection of a trademark, patent or copyright, placed in to circulation in one 
market, and then imported into a second market without the authorization of the local owner of the intellectual 
property rights.”58   
Though the trading of parallel imports remains controversial by signifying yet another threat to IPR 
protection, such goods do not directly infringe upon IPRs in the form of piracy or counterfeiting.  Instead, in the 
case of pharmaceuticals, a patented product that is exported and re-imported may disrupt the discriminatory 
pricing of that product in its original market due to the price differential between the market where it was 
developed, and the market from which it was re-imported. 59  Further, when the cost of buying, transporting and 
marketing goods is below the price of the same good in another market, there exists an arbitrage opportunity to 
profit from said differential.60  Thus, participants in the trading of parallel imports have an incentive to target 
markets where such an opportunity for arbitrage is presented.61 
  Accordingly, variations in pharmaceutical prices between two different markets can result from a number 
of factors including transport costs, relative demand and supply, tariffs and import fees, etc.62 However, 
considering that parallel importing is a legal practice, it is therefore, often the lack of conformity between different 
countries’ IPR policies that allows it to take place.63 Thus, the prices of patented products in one country may not 
only accentuate the opportunity for arbitrage by heightening the price differential between two markets, but will 
also be subsequently affected by respective re-importation.64   
Hypothetically, if a product produced in the United States is protected by a patent when it is exported to 
another country say, pre-2005 India (where pharmaceutical products were not yet patentable), it would thus be 
exposed to the open market where it may be reproduced by generic manufacturers. 65  Accordingly, the 
reproduction of the patented product and its re-importation back into the U.S. would decrease the price of the 
branded product in the U.S. by serving as a lower-priced substitute.  Therefore, although no legal infringements 
may be made relative to the patent policies of two countries, there is still potential for the re-importation of 
products to perpetuate the undermining of IPRs.66 
Consistent with pharmaceutical companies’ concern for IPR protection, parallel importing inherently 
poses the same risks as other threats, adding to the deterrence of capital. Considered by the International 
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Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (IFPMA) to be “detrimental to intellectual property 
rights,”67 new products may be vulnerable to open-market pricing similar to how products would be priced in 
many generic markets, or in the absence of IPR protection all together (not accounting for import costs).68  By 
creating a greater supply of generic substitutes at lower prices than patented products, parallel imports may 
interfere with the ability of patent holders to profit in said markets by alleviating exclusivity.69  Thus, considering 
the necessity for the progression of pharmaceutical innovations, there may exist a trade-off similarly inherent to 
that of formal IPR policies; between short-term costs and long-term benefits in the regulation of parallel imports 
and the prices of pharmaceutical products.70  In other words, parallel importing decreases the prices of drugs for 
consumers,71 yet decreases the innovation of new medical technologies by firms.72 
Exemplary of its impact on innovation, studies estimate parallel imports to have comprised up to 10% of 
pharmaceutical market volume in 2006, and to have generated revenues of approximately $7.4 billion in the EU 
alone (This is thought to be part of an increasing trend, signifying that estimates for today may be substantially 
higher). 73 Further, because re-imported goods are generally sold in generic markets, the estimated profit losses 
endured by developing firms may be more than double the corresponding revenue generated by parallel 
importing.74 Accordingly, the disincentive firms have to develop and market new products is evidenced by the 
undermining affects that re-importation has on patents, and the losses potentially endured by participating in 
relative markets.   
 In terms of regulatory measures, though WTO efforts to harmonize trade amongst the differing policy 
environments of member countries has been oriented in IPR protection, little consideration has been given in the 
context of parallel imports.  Referring to re-importation as “exhaustion” (in the sense that it exhausts patents’ 
rights to market exclusivity)75, the TRIPS agreement expressively excludes such practices from discussion.  Per 
Article six of TRIPS:  
 
“For the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the provisions of 
Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of 
intellectual property rights.” 
 
 Accordingly, though the objective of the TRIPS agreement to standardize IPR protection policies 
seemingly applies to the control of parallel imports between member nations,76 its lack of consideration for 
nations’ independent policies, or for other countries involved in the re-importation of patented products may erode 
the effectiveness of WTO objectives.  Consequently, so long as the parallel importing of goods creates generic 
markets where patents are held by parent substitutes, the patent laws mandated by TRIPS are likely to be less 
effective in facilitating FDI and the development of medical technology in those domestic markets.77 
Consistent with the absence of re-importation provisions in the TRIPS agreement, it is arguable that the 
treatment of compulsory licensing per the agreement serves as an additional variable that perpetuates the 
opportunity for parallel importing to take place.  As discussed previously, the TRIPS agreement effectively leaves 
the required parameters for the granting of compulsory licenses to the subjectivity of an issuing country.78 As it is 
written: 
“Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of the 
commercial exploitation of which is necessary…”79 
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 Nations therefore have the option (and possibly the incentive) of exercising these ‘licenses of right’ 
against the patents of pharmaceutical products that are not only produced domestically, but are imported as well.  
Thus, because exclusions from patentability (compulsory licenses) are able to be determined by governments 
“within their territory” even WTO members are not entirely barred from participating in, or even facilitating 
parallel importing as a means of profiting from the margin that generic reproduction might create.  Therefore, not 
only does parallel importing pose risks to companies and thus potentially deter FDI, but the treatment of 
compulsory licenses per the TRIPS agreement may heighten those risks and further disrupt the same trading 
practices it is designed to facilitate.   
Particular to India in the context of parallel imports, its ability to appropriately moderate its policy regime 
to generate the inflow of capital is not strictly dependent on its own treatment of patent protection, but is 
necessarily influenced by the IPR policies of countries with which it trades; specifically those from which it 
imports.  However, while modifications to the TRIPS agreement might be the most viable means of regulating 
parallel importing, India’s treatment of its own policies regarding compulsory licensing and the re-importing of 
pharmaceuticals may afford it the greatest opportunity to promote FDI in its domestic industries in the short and 
medium run. 
6. Is Regional Price Discrimination the Answer? 
 
Emerging country policy makers have accused the patent-holding pharmaceutical companies of ignoring the 
affordability factor of [low income] households and have accused such companies of setting pricing mechanisms 
that are often deemed ‘too high to afford’.  Therefore, many nations justify patent infringement cases on the 
grounds of citizens’ rights to healthcare and drugs.  This, of course, has created a disincentive for pharmaceutical 
FDI to be injected into countries that have adapted protectionist policies such as India, causing a lag in medical 
research and technology.  Price discrimination80, where lower prices are charged to poorer nations and where lost 
revenue in recovered through economies of scale, may work well provided there are no parallel imports. This is 
where the institutional factors take over: pharmaceutical companies must accept ‘losing a region’ (in market share) 
to parallel imports as a result of issuing local patents and using regional, cheaper price points, or they will be 
forced to fight such losses through lobbying and WTO efforts.     
In all, one may say, that pertinent to patent infringement arguments, the pharmaceutical industry has also 
been very slow to responding to the ‘real’ needs of emerging nations in terms of healthcare provisions.  One 
outcome of such high pharmaceutical costs has been the popularity of any party or political movement that will 
dispense free drugs in exchange for radical politics.   
7. Is Corruption a Factor? 
 
Corruption, which might be considered a form of private taxation, is prevalent throughout the world. When 
risk/reward/penalty ratios of public officials are not in line, corruption becomes institutionalized.  In some 
countries, it is sanctified and institutionalized across all levels of public service.  In others, it is penalized only in 
regional or local services, if observed.  Corrupt business practices offer an additional disincentive for companies to 
participate in a particular market.   
In the context of the pharmaceutical industry, corruption is another barrier that could potentially disrupt 
the inflow of FDI via the inherent risk of illegitimacies such as bribery and piracy remaining prevalent in Indian 
commerce.81  In the same way that weak IPR protection may provide a disincentive by increasing risk and thus 
potential costs for pharmaceutical firms, the prevalence of corruption deters FDI under the same consideration.   
According to Transparency International (2009), the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which indicates 
the amount of perceived corruption in the public sector of a country or territory, denotes India as 3.4 on a scale of 
ten, where ten is the least corrupt.82  An additional survey conducted by an independent committee for the 
Government of India (2000) found that of all Indians utilizing government services, nearly half admitted to using 
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bribes as part of doing business.83  In fact, according to an article by Business Standard (2008), Transparency 
International ranks India as one of the world’s five worst bribe payers, sharing the ranks with Brazil, Mexico, 
China and Russia.84  The extent of this subornment not only lessens the transparency of Indian policy, but it 
undermines the rule of law and questions the ability of Indian regulators to see that it be enforced.  Further, in 
terms of the perception of foreign firms, the pervasiveness of corruption may propagate the notion that Indian 
policy lacks credibility, which amplifies the risk associated with conducting operations in such an environment. 
 In contrast, it is evident that the government of India has shown extraordinary efforts over the past decade 
to adopt the TRIPS agreement and enforce its policies.  It is also true that the physical presence of multinational 
firms may help to alleviate corrupt practices per the natural course of serving self-interests (i.e. monitoring and 
controlling specific risk).  However, the overall presence of corruption in India remains high relative to other 
countries, which inherently poses risks to foreign firms.  As a result, not only do such risks correspond to costs in 
company projections, there is a blatant cost incorporated with a firm devoting private efforts to securitize its 
assets.85   
 In addition, perpetuating the rifeness of corruption is the treatment of perpetrators under Indian law, in 
which no disincentive exists to deter individuals from bribing public officials.  According to Prasad (2007), “the 
Indian Penal Code specifically prohibits bribery of public servants, but prosecutes the individual receiving the 
bribe, not the other party involved in the act of bribery itself”.  This asymmetric application of penalty promotes 
and incentivizes bribery schemes.    In addition, anti-bribery laws do not apply to private citizens doing business, 
but merely to those individuals who are or are about to become public servants.86 Thus, one may argue that absent 
the risk of prosecution, there is no reason for individuals not to offer bribes as tools of persuasion in dealings with 
governmental officials.  In fact, a survey by India’s Central Vigilance Commission (2000) reveals that bribes may 
be used in as many has half of all government service transactions.87  
Recently, much progress has been made in dealing with large-scale corruption in India, as national and 
regional tolerance for such activity has dissipated.  Increased objectivity in journalism has disseminated 
information, resulting in large retail, refinery, and telecom companies being penalized for acts of bribery.  
Nonetheless, there still remains many institutional factors that have yet to be changed.  Considering that the 
recipient of a bribe in India (assuming prosecution is rendered) is punishable merely by a fine and-or 
imprisonment of up to three years,88 it is questionable the extent to which such a punishment discourages a bribe’s 
acceptance.  To give a comparative perspective, the acceptance of a bribe by a U.S. public official is punishable by 
up to fifteen years in prison, with fines as high as triple the value of the bribe, or both, as well as the possible 
disbarment from any public position thereafter [See Appendix 1C].89  Accordingly, the disincentive for a public 
authority to accept a bribe is likely to be much higher under a penal code such as that of the United States as 
opposed to that of India.   
 In the context of foreign investment, the extent to which a domestic government entity or public authority 
is motivated to act in accordance with the law is negatively correlated with the degree of risk borne by the foreign 
party with which it interacts.  In other words, the less variability presented between expressed policy and applied 
policy, as differentiated by corrupt practices, the more accurately firms will be able to forecast future returns on 
investments—the market will be considered less risky and thus more attractive for FDI.  As suggested by Hemant 
N. Joshi (2003), associate director of pharmaceutical R&D at Barr Laboratories, “Transparent policies are 
essential to attract long-term investments;” “widespread corruption and a deeply integrated system of bribery make 
every transaction complicated and expensive.” In fact, it is reported that U.S. companies in India lost upwards of 
$500 million in 2004 from the piracy of copyrighted materials.90  Of course, while copyrights do not have a 
specific application in the protection of pharmaceuticals, the prevalence of corruption in IPR-related industries is 
nonetheless illustrated by such losses.   
 Consistent with risks implied by the opaqueness of policies, the unpredictability of markets resulting from 
corrupt practices is similarly implicative to the provision of economic incentives for investment.  Foregone profits 
as high a half-billion dollars for instance, illustrate a large scope of unforeseeable, potential costs.  Accordingly, 
even though India boasts an economic environment conducive for firms attaining optimum profits, so long as the 
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variability of profits remains high, risk averse companies are likely to opt to invest in a more reliable market where 
similar or even slightly less profits may be achieved with greater certainty.   
8.  Proposed Solutions to Appropriating FDI in India 
 
Due to trade-offs inherent in the appropriation of patent policy, there is a delicate balance that must be reached—a 
sort of equilibrium—in which India is able to foster a healthy amount of economic growth without jeopardizing 
regional interests, its domestic industries, or human welfare.91  Exemplified by prior Indian policies, laws too 
heavily centred on facilitating only the growth or protection of one particular facet such as FDI (pre-1970) or 
domestic equity and affordable healthcare (post-1970), can be economically detrimental.  In other words, it creates 
an imbalance in India’s institutional environment.  Accordingly, it is necessary to take into consideration the 
degree of impact that the treatment of such policies has in correspondence to the creation of incentives (or 
disincentives) for pharmaceutical firms. 
Fundamental to managing incentives with policy application is the notion that firms are profit seeking, 
and thus drawn to an investment with the expectation of realizing greater returns than would be made by investing 
in a comparable alternative. This means that the more risks seemingly associated with investment in India, the 
more disincentives firms have to invest.  Therefore, as patent protection in pharmaceutical markets is often a 
precondition for profiting from the development of new drugs, threats to IPRs such as parallel importing or 
compulsory licensing may pose huge risks to profitability; hence, largely contribute to the deterrence of capital.  
Therefore, in order to provide incentives that not only attract FDI, but also promote the production of medical 
innovations, India must use its policy regime to diminish the risks associated with investment in its pharmaceutical 
industry.   
First, procedures for honouring exceptions to patentability and the issuance of compulsory licenses must 
be clearly and thoroughly defined by India. Although, acknowledging the purposefulness of compulsory licensing 
in highly extraordinary or disastrous circumstances (i.e. patented medicines needed to fight a plague-like 
epidemic), it is imperative that such intrusive options remain. However, it is equally important that such 
circumstances be defined in a way to ensure that the criteria for issuing compulsory licenses be as standardized 
and transparent as possible, and limited to highly exceptional cases such as those that may arise, say, once in a 
decade.  The central focus for standardizing compulsory license issuance is to perpetuate the notion that such 
licenses are not granted subject to casual interests of the issuing country, but rather, to earnestly serve the public 
welfare independent from political motive. 
In view of concerns for companies, the relative risks implicated by compulsory licenses are not so much 
derived from the potential for patent rights to be negated, but the unpredictability of how, when, and to what extent 
such licenses are implemented.   Comparatively, the United States uses compulsory licenses against patents, yet 
has seen little deterrence in the innovation of pharmaceutical products.  In fact, while the U.S. retains its right to 
void patents, it remains a world leader in medical innovations (producing fifteen Nobel prizes in medicine 1996 
and 2006, compared to seven issued to researchers elsewhere).92   
Accordingly, the reason that compulsory licenses are evidently perceived as being less risky to patent-
holders in the United States is due in part to its attempt to assign licenses based on “objective, verifiable 
criteria.”93 As explained by Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Anti-Trust Division at 
the U.S. Department of Justice (2004), “when uncertainty increases, innovation often decreases, which is exactly 
opposite of what should be the long-term goal of competition law.” 
In terms of sustaining medical innovation and attracting FDI, heightening the transparency of its 
compulsory licensing procedures and abiding by a continuous, consistent regiment for issuing such licenses may 
decrease the perceived risk associated with relative Indian policies.  Consequentially, it may increase the incentive 
for foreign firms to invest in India’s pharmaceutical industry.  If, like in the United States, the option for 
compulsory licenses exists but the parameters for issuance are clearly identified, then the uncertainty of patent 
protection as a result of those licenses is diminished.   
Secondly, India must protect its domestic patents from the undermining effects of parallel importing.  
While there is no doubt that diluting its markets with substitute products makes certain drugs more affordable to 
Indian consumers, the Indian pharmaceutical industry simultaneously suffers because of it.  Similar to the risks 
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presented by vague compulsory licensing policies, parallel importing increases the uncertainty for firms to 
generate profits in markets to which products are re-imported by negating patent holders’ rights to exclusivity.  
Thus, it may be beneficial for India, in the context of its industries, to restrict products identified to be substitutes 
of domestically patented products from being imported into the country.  Doing so may help to protect the 
revenues of indigenous and foreign firms alike from the threat of anticompetitive substitutes.   
Thirdly, imperative to the success of the two aforementioned policy changes is the eradication of the high 
degree of corruption in India’s political system.  In terms of associating predictability with risk, rule of law is only 
as reliable as the stringency with which it is enforced.  Further, if corruption is as prevalent in Indian government 
as studies suggest, then it may be inferred that the lack of congruency between policies and procedures makes 
reliance on India’s policies considerably risky.  Therefore, even if India revises its policies to offer more 
protection for IPRs by controlling compulsory licensing and parallel importing, such policies will not effectively 
alleviate the risks for investors so long as it remains uncertain as to whether or not those laws will be upheld.   
Holistically, the primary consideration for India in terms of generating FDI is fundamentally centred in its 
control of risk.  Any amendment to policy that affects patents or IPR protection, in turn affects the risks faced by 
companies in India’s pharmaceuticals industry.  Accordingly, the higher the risk firms face, the lower the incentive 
will be to invest.  Thus, to the extent that India wishes to attract FDI, the degree of capital inflow it receives is 
likely to be reactive to its treatment of those policies that influence the predictability of profits.   
Conversely, often contrasting the attempt to generate FDI is the concern for the provision of drugs to 
India’s poorer populations.  The problem exists, that while it is discernable that appropriate amounts of FDI are 
beneficial to India in terms of stimulating industry development and facilitating economic growth, the patent 
protection required to attract such capital often leads to drugs being priced at levels which are unaffordable by 
much of the population.  Thus, in trying to find a balance between FDI and the provision of low-priced drugs, it 
would seem logical, at least theoretically, to reciprocate the yields created by patent pricing to help provide drugs 
to India’s poor and thus attain a balance between the incentive for firms to innovate and the wellbeing of the 
Indian people. 
Comprising this theory is the notion that tax revenue generated from pharmaceutical sales might be used 
to establish programs in which patented drugs are made affordable to Indian consumers through government 
subsidies (a form of healthcare for the consumer) and other sources of aid such as the World Health Organization 
(WHO).  The idea is that funding such a program might create a cyclical cash flow; in which a portion of firms’ 
revenue is collected by the Indian government in the form of taxes, and reinvested in the industry via subsidies on 
patented drugs.  Accordingly, firms would be able to profit and thus maintain the incentive to develop new 
medical innovations, while Indian citizens would be afforded the benefits of those innovations without hindering 
the progression of technology.    
To elaborate, assuming that industry revenues would be higher if patent protection were increased as a 
result of the policy amendments mentioned above, then it is likely that the amount of relative tax revenue 
generated by the Indian government would increase as well.  Also, according to Bureaus (2009), India, being a 
developing economy with limited affordability, currently spends only 0.8% of its total GDP on research and 
development for new innovations, compared to more developed countries such as Germany (2.5%), Japan (3.1%), 
France (2.2%), or the U.S. (2.8%).  Thus, consistent with establishing a system more conducive to innovation, 
comparison suggests that an increased financial effort from the Indian government might be helpful in facilitating 
growth.  Such a subsidy would serve as an economic stimulant initiated at the consumer level; a sort of ‘trickle-up’ 
approach to government spending.   
In addition, more sources of funding may be available to further the affordability of drugs in India by 
contributing to subsidy programs.  According to ELab Medical (2008), a study by the Institute for Health Metrics 
and Evaluation (IHME) reveals that the amount of health funding for developing countries totaled $21.8 billion in 
2007, mentioning India specifically as a recipient of “huge amounts of health aid.”  Therefore, if such aid were 
coupled with government funds to subsidize the purchasing of patented medicines for lower income individuals, 
then the cost for drugs borne by Indian consumers could be substantially decreased.  Further, depending on the 
degree of consumer demand for drugs and the contributing proportion of drug costs provided by subsidies, it might 
even be possible to lower the consumer-paid portion of drug prices to levels comparable with the prices of generic 
substitutes.  If so, such an approach might also help to alleviate the impact of parallel imports by providing a 
branded drug (often perceived as higher quality) at a price comparable to that of its generic substitute.   
Although, it may be proposed that using tax revenue or charitable donations to further the profits of 
pharmaceutical companies is not an appropriate use of such funds.  Moreover, some may argue that such subsidies 
would only entice firms to increase prices, enabling subsidy programs to be treated like American insurance 
companies (i.e. moral hazard resulting from subsidies that contribute to lower consumer prices, thereby enticing 
firms to use such contributions as sources of revenue).  However, it can be argued conversely that the profit-
seeking behaviour of firms is unending, and without the ability to generate profits pharmaceutical companies 
would not innovate new technologies.  Therefore, the purpose of using charitable funds and taxes to pay for 
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patented drugs is not with the interest of advancing firms’ profits, but with the intent to promote medical 
innovation and develop new possibilities for saving lives.   
Furthermore, it is likely that firms would be more apt to reduce the prices of patented products with a 
government subsidy as opposed to seeking profits through price increases.  Consistent with economic theory, the 
reason for this is because firms will seek to maximize profits where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, and 
would likely be exposed to opportunities through economies of scale.  Initially, lower prices of drugs for 
consumers would cause the quantity demanded to increase (along with the price), but simultaneously cause the 
proportion paid for by subsidy programs to decrease (along with the price).  However, as firms increase the supply 
of patented drugs in the market, the price of those will go down, and the quantity demanded by both consumers 
and subsidy programs will increase.  Accordingly, because the quantity of drugs that firms are able to sell will 
increase as the price of drugs decrease (demand is price elastic), firms have the incentive to lower prices to a level 
that equates the marginal cost of producing a drug with the marginal revenue associated with marketing and 
selling it.    
9. Conclusions 
 
As part of the outlook for India, achieving a scenario that will provide for its industries and residents to receive 
simultaneous benefit is the key to enabling healthy, long-term economic growth.  On one hand, India’s need for 
foreign capital makes it necessary for the rule of law to protect IPRs and pharmaceutical patents.  On the other, 
India must utilize resources afforded by increased FDI to ensure that its people are not deprived of healthcare as a 
consequence to the country’s economic endeavours.  By maintaining such a consciousness of balance, it may be 
feasible to reconcile India’s global verses regional interests in its pharmaceutical industry.  
 Regardless, imperative to its success in either category is India’s ability to make its policies clearly 
defined, and void of influence from corrupt government entities.  Though the absence of corruption and thus risk is 
necessary condition for achieving an optimal inflow of capital, it is also vital to ensure the efficacy of any further 
remedies to appropriate the balance between human and economic interests.  Overall, the growing prominence of 
India’s economic environment projects the potential for a bright future.  Nonetheless, it is how India chooses to 
treat its policies that may determine just how bright that future will be.      
 India has the potential to benefit in the future from its new political environment, even in the absence of 
regional protectionism.  It has comparative cost advantages in producing intermediate pharmaceutical products and 
selling them to patent-honouring countries such as Japan.  It may find end product, as well as market-size 
advantages by designing ethical, large-scale drug trials for companies around the world, which would benefit 
India, its domestic industry, and the world pharmaceutical industry by expediting drug discoveries on a larger 
scale. This is especially true in the development of ‘orphan drugs’ where the diseases are severe but occur rather 
infrequently in most countries.   
Furthermore, India’s large population may be seen as asset in providing larger samples for drugs so that 
trials can be conducted fairly accurately.  Emphasizing the need for ethical drug trials, ultimate liability and the 
proper conduction of such trials remains the responsibility of the administering pharmaceutical firm (not 
necessarily the local subcontractor).  Accordingly, in expecting regional price discrimination, India can examine 
its potential in producing licensed generic drugs and subsidies to its poor while simultaneously honoring 
international patents.   
 Inevitably, the dilemma of regional interests versus global patents is ongoing for pharmaceutical products 
in the world.  India however, has the opportunity to establish a leadership role in this dialogue.  By appropriating 
policies that create win-win situations for its domestic industry and social welfare, it has the potential to create 
positive, future gains all around. 
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Appendix 1A 
AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Article 7 
 
Objectives 
 
 The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers 
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance 
of rights and obligations. 
 
Article 27 
 
Patentable Subject Matter 
 
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any inventions, whether 
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are 
capable of industrial application.94  Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and 
paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the 
place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced. 
 
2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of the 
commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect order public or morality, including to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not 
made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law. 
 
3. Members may also exclude from patentability: 
 
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals; 
 
(b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes.  
However,  Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an 
effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof.  The provisions of this subparagraph 
shall be reviewed four years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
 
Article 33 
 
Term of Protection 
 
 The term of protection available shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty years counted 
from the filing date.95 
 
 
Appendix 1B 
 
The Patents Act 1970 
(39 of 1970) 
(Chapter 2) 5. Inventions where only methods or processes of manufacture patentable 
(1) In the case of inventions-  
a. claiming substances intended for use, or capable of being used, as food or as medicine or drug, or  
b. relating to substances prepared or produced by chemical processes (including alloys, optical glass, semi-
conductors and inter-metallic compounds),  
                                                        
94 For the purposes of this Article, the terms "inventive step" and "capable of industrial application" may be deemed by a 
Member to be synonymous with the terms "non-obvious" and "useful" respectively. 
95 It is understood that those Members which do not have a system of original grant may provide that the term of protection 
shall be computed from the filing date in the system of original grant. 
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no patent shall be granted in respect of claims for the substances themselves, but claims for the methods or 
processes of manufacture shall be patentable. 
[(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a claim for patent of an invention for a substance itself 
intended for use, or capable of being used, as medicine or drug, except the medicine or drug specified under sub-
clause (v) of clause (1) of sub-section (1) of section 2, may be made and shall be dealt, without prejudice to the 
other provisions of this Act, in the manner provided in Chapter IVA.] 
 
(Chapter 8) 48. Rights of patentees 
(1) Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, a patent granted before the commencement of this Act, 
shall confer on the patentee the exclusive right by himself, his agents or licensees to make, use, exercise, sell or 
distribute the invention in India. 
(2) Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act and the conditions specified in section 47, a patent granted 
after the commencement of this Act shall confer upon the patentee - 
a. where the patent is for an article or substance, the exclusive right by himself, his agents or licensees to 
make, use, exercise, sell or distribute such article or substance in India;  
b. where a patent is for a method or process of manufacturing an article or substance, the exclusive right by 
himself, his agents or licensees to use or exercise the method or process in India.  
 
Appendix 1C 
 
18 U.S.C. § 201 : US Code - Section 201: Bribery of public officials and witnesses 
 
(a) For the purpose of this section - (1) the term "public official" means Member of Congress, Delegate, or 
Resident Commissioner, either before or after such official has qualified, or an officer or employee or person 
acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department, agency or branch of Government thereof, including 
the District of Columbia, in any official function, under or by authority of any such department, agency, or branch 
of Government, or a juror; (2) the term "person who has been selected to be a public official" means any person 
who has been nominated or appointed to be a public official, or has been officially informed that such person will 
be so nominated or appointed; and (3) the term "official act" means any decision or action on any question, matter, 
cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before 
any public official, in such official's official capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit.  
(b) Whoever - (1) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of value to any public official 
or person who has been selected to be a public official, or offers or promises any public official or any person who 
has been selected to be a public official to give anything of value to any other person or entity, with intent - (A) to 
influence any official act; or (B) to influence such public official or person who has been selected to be a public 
official to commit or aid in committing, or collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission 
of any fraud, on the United States; or (C) to induce such public official or such person who has been selected to be 
a public official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official or person; (2) being a 
public official or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, 
accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for: 
(A) being influenced in the performance of any official act; (B) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, 
or to collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; or 
(C) being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of the official duty of such official or person; (3) directly 
or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any person, or offers or promises such 
person to give anything of value to any other person or entity, with intent to influence the testimony under oath or 
affirmation of such first-mentioned person as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court, 
any committee of either House or both Houses of Congress, or any agency, commission, or officer authorized by 
the laws of the United States to hear evidence or take testimony, or with intent to influence such person to absent 
himself therefrom; (4) directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or 
accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity in return for being influenced in testimony 
under oath or affirmation as a witness upon any such trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in return for absenting 
himself therefrom; shall be fined under this title or not more than three times the monetary equivalent of the thing 
of value, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not more than fifteen years, or both, and may be disqualified from 
holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.  
(c) Whoever - (1) otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty - (A) directly or 
indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any public official, former public official, or person 
selected to be a public official, for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public 
official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official; or (B) being a public official, former 
public official, or person selected to be a public official, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper 
discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept 
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anything of value personally for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such official or 
person; (2) directly or indirectly, gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any person, for or because of the 
testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be given by such person as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or other 
proceeding, before any court, any committee of either House or both Houses of Congress, or any agency, 
commission, or officer authorized by the laws of the United States to hear evidence or take testimony, or for or 
because of such person's absence therefrom; (3) directly or indirectly, demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees 
to receive or accept anything of value personally for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or 
to be given by such person as a witness upon any such trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or for or because of such 
person's absence therefrom; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both. (d) 
Paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (b) and paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (c) shall not be construed to 
prohibit the payment or receipt of witness fees provided by law, or the payment, by the party upon whose behalf a 
witness is called and receipt by a witness, of the reasonable cost of travel and subsistence incurred and the 
reasonable value of time lost in attendance at any such trial, hearing, or proceeding, or in the case of expert 
witnesses, a reasonable fee for time spent in the preparation of such opinion, and in appearing and testifying. (e) 
The offenses and penalties prescribed in this section are separate from and in addition to those prescribed in 
sections 1503, 1504, and 1505 of this title.  
 
http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/uscode/18/I/11/201 
Date Accessed: 10/27/09
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